EMPIRICAL EFFECTS OF POLICY INDUCED COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF DISTRICT HEATING PRICING IN FINLAND 1996-2002 by Peltola-Ojala, Päivi & Linden, Mikael
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EMPIRICAL EFFECTS OF POLICY INDUCED 
COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY: 
THE CASE OF DISTRICT HEATING PRICING IN 
FINLAND 1996-2002 
 
Päivi Peltola-Ojala 
Mikael Linden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 952-458-737-8 
ISSN 1795-7885 
no 29 
    EMPIRICAL EFFECTS OF POLICY INDUCED COMPETITION  
    IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF DISTRICT 
                   HEATING PRICING IN FINLAND 1996-2002 ** 
 
                                       Päivi Peltola-Ojala  &  Mikael Linden* 
 
 
 
                                                                 Abstract 
The household electricity markets in Finland were opened to the competition in the 1st of 
November 1998. At the same time, the electricity transmission and distribution networks were 
regulated by special legislation by the Act on Electricity Markets and by special regulator the 
Electricity Market Authority. The regulation was extended to limit the unreasonable pricing 
and to separate the different business units (production, distribution and sales). The district 
heating industry is regulated through the general Competition Laws. The district heating 
industry is considered to have a regional monopoly within its distribution network and the 
level of public ownership within the industry is high. 
 
The aim of the study is to analyse how the policy induced competition in the electricity 
industry has affected the district heating industry. Some effects are expected since both 
industries compete in the same household heating goods markets. The effects are studied 
through pricing behaviour by using panel data models. The data consists of 76 district heating 
companies in Finland in years 1996 – 2002. The results indicate that the electricity market 
reform caused a slight decrease to the district heating price. However, the results imply that 
the effect was only short term. The price decrease was stronger in apartment houses than in 
small houses. The results indicate also that the large and market dominant firms have been 
more policy reform responsive than small firms.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Household energy markets, deregulation, market shares 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
*)  University of Joensuu, Department of Economics and Business, Yliopistokatu 7,BOX 111,  
     FIN - 80101. mika.linden@joensuu.fi,  paivi.peltola@joesuu.fi.  
 
**) Paper presented at the 28th IAEE International Conference, 3rd – 6th  of June 2005 in   
      Taipei, Taiwan.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
District heating industry can be defined as production and distribution of hot water in heating 
network. Therefore, the core of district heating business is the distribution and the production. 
This study concentrates to the core areas of district heating business.  
The production of district heating is divided to separate production, CHP production and 
industrial process heat production. In 2003, the total district heating production was 32.2 
TWh1. The share of CHP production was 75 % and separate production 25 % of district 
heating (SKY ry, 2004). The number of CHP companies was about 20 % of total district 
heating companies. The district heating industry is quite heterogeneous, because in one hand 
there are only few large energy companies and on the other hand there is some small so called 
one-man companies, which run very small-scale district heating distribution business.  
The Figure 1 illustrates operating of the district heating company. The district heating 
company can be theoretically divided to production, distribution, and sales business. 
Nowadays, most of the district heating companies are vertically integrated so all business 
elements belong to same company. In practice the division can be done by bookkeeping in 
large companies, but the division of small companies is difficult. In a small district heating 
company there is only few employers to take care of the production and distribution activities 
and the managing director handles the distribution and sales contracts. Especially in many 
small companies the maintenance services of the distribution network are outsourced. In some 
municipalities also the production business is separated to an own company so that the district 
heating water is produced in different industrial company, which production process produces 
hot water as side product, or production units are divided to an independent production 
companies. These independent production companies do not usually own any distribution 
network, because they only take care of the district heating water production. 
The distribution network business includes network building and maintenance and the 
distribution of district heating. The sales business includes purchases of district heating and 
sales and marketing of district heating services to the customer. Only the sales business has a 
straight contact to the customer, because customer can not buy distribution service from one 
company, and district heating product (hot water) from another company (straight from a 
producer or other seller). The sales business is quite difficult to separate from distribution 
                                                 
1 TWh = terawatt hour i.e. 1 TWh = 1 000 GWh = 1 000 000 MWh 
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business. Therefore, the most interesting part of the district heating business is, at least from 
this study’s point of view,  production and distribution.  
 
Figure 1. The district heating company. 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENERGY MARKET REGULATION 
The energy markets have witnessed large changes during last 20 years. The most important 
change was deregulation of electricity markets in the 1990’s. The prices of energy products 
were under state control until the end of 1980’s. The price control was based on follow-up of 
production costs and advance notification of price increases. The follow-up of costs and 
development of pricing principles was done coordination with district heating and electricity 
sellers. Therefore, the pricing mechanisms of district heating and electricity are still quite 
alike. When the price control was ended in the end of 1980’s there was a need to prevent 
excess pricing of energy products by promoting competition (Kauppa- ja teollisuusministeriö, 
1994, 9). The deregulation of electricity markets took place gradually. In 1995 the Electricity 
Market Act game to force. It was based to the EU-legislation Directive 96/92. By the 
Electricity Market Act, the electricity markets were opened to competition. In the beginning, 
only the large customers with over 500 kW capacities per operational unit were entitled to 
buy the electricity from the competitive markets. In the beginning of 1997 all customers could 
by electricity from the competitive markets, but in practice, the small customers could not 
take part because of an expensive metering.  
Situation of the small customers was improved in the autumn 1998 when balance-sheet 
clearance introduced so called type load system. Since September 1998 the households have 
not been needing electricity meter, which registers the consumption hourly basis, in order to 
buy electricity from competitive markets. Since November 1998 the electricity meter, which 
registers the consumption hourly basis, does not need also the customers which main fuse is 
maximum 3 x 36 ampere and order capacity maximum 45 kW (Energiamarkkinavirasto, 
2004). 
A special authority was founded to enforce the operation of the electricity markets. It was 
called Electricity Market Authority. Since the jurisdiction of Electricity Market Authority was 
extended to include natural gas markets the name was changed to Energy Market Authority in 
1st August 2000. The Energy Market Authority does not have jurisdiction concerning district 
heating markets. In addition to the electricity markets the natural gas markets are also 
deregulated. 
During last few years the Energy Market Authority has increased the regulation of electricity 
distribution and transmission network business. The Authority has introduced a control 
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system for reasonable pricing (Energiamarkkinavirasto, 2004). The sales price of electricity 
power (the energy tariff) is determined in the competitive markets. In the end of September 
2004, the Energy Market Authority has taken the initiative to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry to reform the rules concerning the differentiation of electricity businesses and 
enforcement of reasonable pricing (Dnro 165/61/2004). In the end on 2004 the Parliament 
gave Acts which include rules limiting the level of reasonable profits from the electricity and 
the natural gas network business (L 1127/2004 and L 1293/2004). 
In addition to the changes in the rules concerning electricity and natural gas markets the 
whole energy business has concentrated. Small energy companies have combined to regional 
energy companies. Even, some large foreign energy companies have bought Finnish energy 
companies and started their operations in Finland. 
At the moment the district heating business has no special regulation. The operations of the 
district heating company is judged by general Competition Laws i.e. the Act on Competition 
Restrictions(L 480/1992) and Act on Improper Business Action(L 1061/1978). The Finnish 
Competition legislation has been harmonized with EU Competition Law, so the effect of EU 
case law will probably increase. 
The special Competition Law concerning electricity and natural gas markets has the same aim 
but at some level the rules are stricter e.g. concerning unreasonable pricing. Therefore, the 
case law concerning these markets is not directly comparable. 
 
III. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Some studies have argued that the threat of regulation causes decrease in prices. The 
monopoly company behaves more competitive manner without any regulation, when the 
neighbouring business has been regulated. A German study described electricity markets, in 
which electricity transmission and distribution were unregulated but the electricity sales was 
regulated (Brunekreeft 2004. If the threat of regulation is real and credible, the threatened 
company has an incentive to limit its pricing. This leads to a situation where user price ends 
up to a lower level than if company freely maximises its profits (Brunekreeft 2004, 294).  
The target of this article is to study whether the regulation of other energy markets through 
Electricity Market Act in 1997 has caused effects to the district heating pricing to the 
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household customers. We have used two price variables: total district heating price to small 
houses and total district heating price to terraced houses and blocks. Also we study whether 
there was effects of 2001 Competition Council’s decisions concerning the district heating 
pricing are under investigation (Kilpailuneuvosto, d:o 151/690/1999, Helsingin Energia and 
Kilpailuneuvosto, d:o 173/690/2000 Kuopion Energia). In 1999 the Competition Authority 
had proposed Competition Council to prohibit Helsingin Energia’s abuse of dominance by 
unreasonable pricing and order sanctions. According to the Competition Authority the 
electricity and district heating pricing had been unreasonable since 1st September, 1992. 
Similar proposition was given in 2000 in Kuopio Energia case. According to the Competition 
Authority the electricity and district heating price has been unreasonable at least in 1997 – 
1999. In 2001, the Competition Council gave a decision that it could not find enough 
evidence on abuse of dominance by unreasonable pricing. 
(Driffield & Ioanniadis, 2000) analyzed the profit effects of investigation and regulation of 
the UK petrol industry. The study evaluated empirically the effects of 1979 and 1990 
Monopolies and Mergers Commissions (MMC) investigations, Trade and Industry Select 
Committees investigations of 1988, and the petrol price marking order of 1981. The results 
showed clearly that the instigation of the 1979 MMC inquiry had a significant negative effect 
on the profit margins of the petrol companies. All other investigations, or attempts at 
regulation have been ineffective at reducing profitability (Driffield & Ioannidis 2000, 369-
378). Since the effect has been long-term the study concludes, that the regulatory bodies in 
the UK had a significant effect on consumption efficiency within the petrol industry. This is 
despite the fact that the industry has never been found to act against the public interest 
(Driffield & Ioannidis 2000, 380). These investigations were self regulative since the industry 
had permanently reduced its profit level. 
The third question involves the firm specific effects. We analyse which firm specific factors 
affect to the responsiveness on policy changes. Whether the large companies are more 
responsive to the regulatory threat than small companies, which can be an example of 
“regulatory threat hypothesis”. Does join production companies, i.e. companies which 
produce both electricity and district heating, behave more responsively? Are companies which 
have large market share in the energy goods markets more policy response than many small 
firms? 
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Some studies have argued that firm specific effects matter. First, data from oil crisis of the 
late 1970s was used as a case study to explain the threat of regulation (Erfle, McMillan & 
Grofman 1990, 49). Grofman proposed the “regulatory threat hypothesis” which states, that 
”when the threat of governmental price regulation is high, the larger, more visible firms in the 
threatened industry restrain price increases on those products where price changes are readily 
apparent to the public; the smaller, less visible firms do no exercised such price moderation. 
As the threat of governmental price regulation diminishes, firms which had previously 
exhibited price restraint (and thus whose products are underpriced relative to the market 
norm) rapidly increase prices to equalize with the industry average” (Erfle, McMillan & 
Grofman 1989, 136). The study used different dummy variables which described the amount 
of news time and reports concerning federal government’s interest on oil industry. The 
empirical study revealed three factors that affect the threat of regulation. 1) The intensity of 
public opinion demanding intervention, 2) the government’s capacity to react to that pressure, 
and 3) the availability of external scapegoats which deflect public attention from regulation 
(Erfle, McMillan & Grofman 1990, 60). They also find evidence to the “regulatory threat 
hypothesis”. 
Second, Glazer and McMillan (1992) had studied factors affecting to company’s pricing 
behaviour when they are threatened with regulation (see also Block et al. 1981). Special 
interest was headed to changes in pricing marginal. They stated that separation of business 
units is important when changes in operational environment increase the probability of 
regulation and decrease the effects of price increases. They followed Peltzman’s (1976) idea 
in which the legislator prefers a product price lower than the monopoly price, but greater than 
the price at zero profit level. The legislator faces different problems. First, how to design 
methods so, that the regulator is not under industry’s control. Second, should cross-
subsidisation be allowed and at what level. Third, how avoid changes in companies capital 
during the law is passed and it is executed (Glazer & McMillan 1992, 1089 – 1090). The 
study used game theory approach. They found that the increase in production costs decrease 
company’s profits, profits of regulation, and probability to carry out regulation. The existence 
of other legislative initiatives increases legislators’ costs and decrease probability of 
regulation. The monopoly’s price increases increase public pressure to decrease prices and 
increase profits from regulation. The results were as expected. The study examined also the 
costs of regulation more detailed. They discovered that the increase in the costs of regulation 
can cause both increase and decrease in companies’ prices (Glazer & McMillan 1992, 1093). 
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Threatened monopolist may try to avoid price rise if price rise increases the probability of 
regulation. But if regulator allows price rises to cover the increases in costs the threat of 
regulation may cause, the threatened monopolist to absorb cost increases. Therefore, the 
increase in production costs diminishes probability of regulation and increases expected 
profits. If average costs are constant, the monopoly sets the price to a level by which it only 
just avoids regulation. Then the company tries to increase price above average costs to level 
in which consumer welfare diminishes to the critical level. If demand curve is convex enough 
the difference between price and average costs causes increased effect to the profits. For 
example when demand is inelastic, the effect in consumer welfare equals the effect in profits 
and with more elastic demand the effects to the consumer welfare dominate. Then the 
company can earn higher profits at the same time it avoids regulation when production costs 
are high (Glazer & McMillan 1992, 1094 – 1095). 
 
Third, Linden (2004) proposed a model where the incidence of regulation is an increasing 
function of monopoly price. It was also assumed that the regulator can identify the monopoly 
without knowing its cost structure and regulation threat imposes an implicit or explicit 
competitive price that deviates from observed (monopoly) supply price. Under the credible 
threat of regulation monopolist self-regulates its price on the level that is between the 
competitive and monopoly price. The risk of being regulated causes the monopoly to pay 
price premium to the consumers. The implications of the model for practical competition 
policy are clear. The authorities need not run extensive and costly regulation program. Some 
randomly chosen regulation cases and credible regulation threat may be more effective in 
cost-benefit terms.  
 
IV. ECONOMETRIC MODEL, METHODS AND DATA 
In the companion paper (Linden & Peltola-Ojala 2005) it was shown that the following 
dynamic panel data model based on SCP – framework familiar in industrial economics gives 
satisfactory results (for details see Appendix 1).   
 
                        
1 3 4
5 6 7
  
                  
it i t it -1 it it
it it it it
lnEprice lnEprice DPUB lnMS
lnFUEL lnSCALE lnPRODS
α λ β β β
β β β
= + + + +
+ + + ε+
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 where  
                 = firm’s energy tariff for the district heat. lnEprice
                    =   -dummy for the local public or state ownership of the firm. DPUB 0 /1
                      = the market share of district heat among the all heat products. lnMS
                  = a proxy for firm’s material input unit cost. lnFUEL
                = firm’s output capacity, i.e. how much the firm has produced  lnSCALE
                                    energy per year (measured in GWh). 
               = firm’s production share of district heat. lnPRODS
 
ia  is the firm specific variable for unobserved heterogeneity. tλ  is the common time effect for 
all firms describing the general business conditions. The price, ownership and production 
variables were collected by Finnish District Heating Association. The market share variables 
were collected by Statistics Finland. The data included 76 companies during seven years.  
It was argued that model suffer from endogeneity bias problem. Variables like lnM  
 are typically non-exogenous for firm’s pricing decision. The 
problem can be handled with instrumental variable estimation methods (IV) since technically 
question is of violation of so-called orthogonality conditions, i.e. non-correlation between the 
explanatory variables and error term. Main results from structural model estimation supported 
the non-competitive market structure: large market shares had a positive effects on energy 
tariff levels (see Appendix I, and Linden & Peltola-Ojala  2005).   
S,
and  lnSCALE,  lnPRODS
However the opening of energy markets for competition in the end of 1998 is an exogenous 
policy event that affects firm’s market conditions. Following estimation strategy is used to 
analyse effects of this policy change. We estimate the above model in the pooled and in the 
two way fixed effects model form with IV- method. To secure true exogeneity of policy 
change the residual of these models are analysed with different dummy-variables. Another 
reason for this two step estimation procedure is the problems encountered with IV-estimation 
containing many yearly dummies. We use following dummies for OLS estimation of residuals 
of above structural estimation.  
Constant gives the 1997 tariff level. The level is expected to zero since we analyse the 
residuals. Dummies D98-D02 give the subsequent yearly exogenous (shock) effects on the 
tariff level. Naturally D99 is the most interesting case. Dummy DCOM analyses the case 
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where policy change have permanent effects on the tariff pricing, i.e. has the tariff level been 
since 1999 at lower level than earlier due the competition. Note that the structural model 
contained both lagged endogenous variable and time effects variable. Thus all the trend 
effects are excluded from the residuals. However they can still include some non-modelled 
time specific firm effects. The firm’s response to opening of markets for competition in year 
1999 is a typical firm specific event. Depending on the firm’s market position and share 
policy change can affect its tariff policy.  
 
Table 1. Different yearly policy and shock dummies. 
                               
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1
98 0 1 0 0 0 0
99 0 0 1 0 0 0
00 0 0 0 1 0 0
01 0 0 0 0 1 0
02 0 0 0 0 0 1
Constant
DCOM
D
D
D
D
D
  
 
Figure 2. The difference of the district heating energy tariff and estimated  
                 fuel costs 1996 – 2002. 
 
                    
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
YEAR
-20,00
-10,00
0,00
10,00
20,00
30,00
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349
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112
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The Figure 2 illustrates that the difference of the district heating energy tariff and estimated 
fuel costs difference fluctuates and it is at the lowest level in 2000. Since the fuel costs are 
estimated by market price of used fuel inputs, there are some negative values. Negative valeus 
can be explained with two reasons. First, companies can obtain some discounts when they are 
buying larger amounts, or second, costs and prices are not divided to different district heating 
services similarly in all companies. This is more probable since there are no binding rules 
stating how the tariffs should be formed. 
 
V. RESULTS  
Table 2. gives the OLS-estimations results of different time dummy models. D99 has a 
significant negative impact on the tariff level. However the market opening seems to be a one 
year shot only since the permanent effect dummy DCOM is not significant. However in years 
2001 and 2002 we found tariff effects also. The positive tariff effect 2001 can be caused the 
Competition Council’s acquittal. Tables 3. and 4 give the results for total tariff for small 
houses and apartment houses. Results are similar to Table 2. but for small houses both year 
1999 policy and other year effects are smaller than for apartment houses. General result from 
analysis implies that policy change in 1999 to increase competition in energy markets has 
decreased the tariff prices. However the effect has been only temporary and quite small.  
 
Table 2.Yearly time specific firm effects. OLS on residuals of structural  
              district heating tariff model. Number of firms, N= 76.  Years 
              1997 – 2002, T=6. (HCSE -corrected t-values in parenthesis).  
          
1
0.008 (1.56) 0.007  (0.82) 0.007 (0.83) 0.008 (0.77)
0.010 (-1.01) 0.002 (0.19)
98 -0.003 (-0.22) 0.030 (-0.33)
99 -0.047* (-3.83) -0.048* (-3.69) -0.048* (-3.11) -0.044* (-3.79
FE
IV IVPOOLED PANEL
Constant
DCOM
D
D
−
−
−
2
)
00 -0.010 (-0.66) -0.027* (-2.63)
01 0.053* (3.42) 0.042*   (3.26) 
02 -0.042* (-2.71) -0.030* (-2.06)
0.031 0.002 0.031 0.101 0.107
D
D
D
R
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Table 3. Yearly time specific firm effects. OLS on residuals of structural  
               district heating total tariff (small houses) model. Number of firms,   
               N=76. Years 1997 – 2002, T= 6. (HCSE-corrected t-values  in  
               parenthesis).  
 
          
1
0.004 (1.39) 0.003  (0.72) 0.003 (0.73) 0.007 (1.07)
0.005 (-0.88) 0.001 (0.19)
98 -0.006 (-0.68) 0.004 (-0.45)
99 -0.025* (-3.41) -0.026* (-3.29) -0.028* (-2.98) -0.032* (-4.22
FE
IV IVPOOLED PANEL
Constant
DCOM
D
D
−
−
−
2
)
00 -0.007 (-0.80) -0.019* (-2.61)
01 0.025* (2.72) 0.022*   (3.00) 
02 -0.023* (-2.56) -0.015* (-2.06)
0.025 0.002 0.025 0.085 0.122
D
D
D
R
 
 
 
Table 4. Yearly time specific firm effects. OLS on residuals of structural  
              district heating total tariff (apartment houses) model. Number of  
              firms, N= 76. Years 1997 – 2002, T= 6. (HCSE-corrected t-values in  
              parenthesis).  
 
      
1
0.007* (1.86) 0.007  (1.17) 0.007 (1.25) 0.010 (1.13)
0.010 (-1.45) -0.003 (0.03)
98 -0.004 (-0.37) 0.004 (0.44)
99 -0.043* (-4.57) -0.043* (-4.32) -0.045* (-3.81) -0.038* (-4.24
FE
IV IVPOOLED PANEL
Constant
DCOM
D
D
−
−
2
)
00 -0.008 (-0.67) -0.021* (-2.37)
01 0.028* (2.36) 0.030*  (3.30) 
02 -0.027* (-2.30) -0.014 (-1.58)
0.044 0.005 0.044 0.090 0.130
D
D
D
R
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VI. FIRM SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT IN 1999 
Preceding analysis showed that the firms reacted to opening of energy markets for 
competition in 1999. The effect of reform was decrease - albeit small - in tariffs. Next we 
analyse in details what are the firm specific determinants of year 1999 tariff cut. The analysis 
is conducted with the random coefficient model (RCM) estimation of panel data. We analyse 
once again the residuals ˆ( )itε  from structural model estimation (see Appendix I). Thus we 
estimated above model  
 
                     
1 3 4
5 6 7
  
                  
it i t it -1 it it
it it it it
lnEprice lnEprice DPUB lnMS
lnFUEL lnSCALE lnPRODS
α λ β β β
β β β
= + + + +
+ + + ε+
 
 
to obtain iˆtε  that where analysed with policy change event dummies. Now we use year 1999 
dummy for RCM approach for observations in 1997,......, 2002t =  
 
 
                                                    ˆ 99it i itDε α β μ= + +   , 
                            
           
          where                            
2[ ] 0,     [ ]
                                                                  1,...,76
   with  [ ] 0  and  [ ]
it i i
i i i i
E VAR
i
v E v VAR
μ σ
β β
= =
=
= + = =
μ I
v Ω.
 
 
Thus we have  
 
 
          where                      
2
ˆ 99 ( 99 ) 99 ,
[ ] 0,   [ ] 99 99.
it it it it
it i i
D D v D
E w VAR D D
wε α β μ α β
σ
= + + + = + +
= = +w I Ω
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This is a linear regression model where we allow for firm specific heteroskedasticity and 
correlation across the firms i . iβ  for each firm is a random draw from a distribution with 
overall mean β . RCM enables us to estimate a two component reaction parameter for policy 
change in 1999. Parameter iβ  includes common component for all firm β  and firm specific 
component  vi.  
Once we have obtained firm specific components iβ  ( 1, 2,.......,76)i =  we can analyse their 
distribution and dependence on different firm characteristics in year 1999.  
The results from RCM estimation was following (HCSE  t-values in parenthesis)  
 
                         
2 2ˆ 0.0087 0.052 99,      R 0.03,    (150) 1533.73,
        (1.52)     ( 3.76)
it Dε χ= − = =
−
 
where  is the common reaction. The Chi-square test is for homogeneity ˆ 0.052β = −
´   for  i j i jβ β= ≠ . Clearly the firm specific components ˆiβ  are not equal. Figure 3. gives the 
distribution of iˆβ ’s. It is skewed to the left. This implies that some firms react quite strongly 
to policy change in 1999. Their tariff cut is more than on the average.  
 
Figure 3. The firm specific components i ivβ β= + . 
       
0.10.0-0.1-0.2
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10
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Table 5 gives regression result on iˆβ ’s with suitable firm characteristics. Note that we have 
used scaling  to preserve the logarithmic variables.  ˆln( 10)iβ +
 
Table 5. Firm specific RCM components and firm characteristics in 1999.  
              OLS estimation (BP: Breusch & Pagan test for residual hetero-       
              skedasticity). N= 76 (HCSE-corrected t-values in parenthesis).               
 
     
2
ln ln
2.313* 0.0028* 0.0008 0.0026* 0.0041* 0.0038 0.0012*
(13.12) (2.44) ( 1.01) ( 3.61) ( 2.42) ( 1.07) ( 2.33)
0.248 14.67*
Constant DJOINT DPUB DCOMPANY FUEL lnSCALE PRODS
R BP
− − − − −
− − − − −
= =
 
 
The results are surprising and interesting. Only when the firm produces both electricity and 
heat  the tariff decreasing effect of policy change in 1999 is attenuated. When the 
firm is a part of larger company 
(DJoint)
( 1,  0 otherwise)DCOMPANY =  then the decreasing effects 
are confirmed. Similarly at the firm level large input costs (l and dominant market 
share  are connected with larger than average tariff cuts. The state ownership 
(DPUB) and scale of energy production (lnSCALE) are non-significance for tariff reduction. 
Some firm specific heterogeneity is still present in residuals.  
nFUEL)
(lnPRODS)
Generally the results imply that large and market dominant firms have been more responsive 
to year 1999 energy market reform. Their tariff cuts have been larger than average tariff 
reduction. The results with total tariff for small houses and apartment houses were similar to 
above (not reported).  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The results imply that the opening of electricity market for competition had short term effects 
on district heating pricing. The price effect lasted only about two years. The Competition 
Councils decision had an opposite effect to the district heating pricing. This was obvious 
since the decision was positive, no abuse of dominance through unreasonable pricing can be 
found. 
The most interesting results were found when the firm specific components were analysed for 
year 1999 incidence. The large companies were found to be more responsive to the policy 
changes. This supports the “regulatory threat hypothesis”. Also the joint production 
companies reacted to the policy change. The companies with large input costs were also 
responsive. This is opposite to Glazer and McMillan (1992) view that regulatory threat is less 
probable if production costs are high. However the market share variable correlated with the 
company size variable and had a positive tariff level effect.  
From the regulators and companies point of view the results are encouraging since the related 
industries regulation and competition authorities decision making have direct effects to the 
district heating pricing. The regulatory effects can be achieved without costly. The effects are 
quite strong since the 10 largest district heating companies sell about 50 % the total district 
heating sales (SKY ry, (2003)). 
Until the end of 2004 the electricity and natural gas market regulation has not had specific 
rules on limiting the amount of profits from network business. It will be interesting to carry 
out a follow up study to find out whether this new profit level fixing will have more long term 
effects also to the district heating pricing. 
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 APPENDIX 1a.  IV (2SLS) estimation results for district heat energy tariff in  
                             Finland (lnEpric . Number of firms e) 76N = . Years 1997- 
                              2002,  (HCSE -corrected t-values in parenthesis).  .6T =
 
                               
2
9.293   (-1.63) 0.125  (0.188)
0.005* (1.76) -
0.701*  (15.71) 0.212*  (3.13)
0.012   (0.127) 0.138*  (2.74)
-0.013  (-1.02) 0.094   (0.94)
0.101*  (3.52) 
FE
IV IV
-1
POOLED PANEL
Constant -
TIME
lnEprice
DPUB
lnMS
lnFUEL 0.105*  (2.64)
-0.005  (-0.23) 0.380*  (2.92)
0.017  (1.28) 0.038   (0.82)
0.697 0.813
/ 2.16/-0.08 2.08/-0.05
1.12 2.73
2
lnSCALE
lnPRODS
R
DW AC
Hausman
 
 
*)  significant at 10% critical level or below 
     POOLEDIV: Instrumental variables (IV) estimation. Instruments: all exogenous  
     variables (TIMEr, DPUB, lnFUEL) and one year lagged values of lnFUEL and  
     endogenous variables (lnMS, lnSCALE, lnPRODS).  
    :  2-way fixed effect (2FE) panel data instrumental variable estimation (IV).    2FEIVPANEL
     Instruments: (DPUB, lnFUEL) and one year lagged values of lnFUEL and  
     endogenous variables (lnMS, lnSCALE, lnPRODS).  
     DW/AC:  Durbin-Watson test statistics and estimated residual 1st order autocorrelation  
     Hausman: Orthogonality test for valid instruments (H0: ) IVCorr(X ,ε)=0
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APPENDIX Ib.  IV (2SLS) estimation results for district heat energy total tariff in Finland  
                            (Small houses, ).  Number of firms SMlnEprice 76N = . Years 1997-2002,  
                               (HCSE -corrected t-values in parenthesis).  .6T =
 
                               
2
.314   (-1.48) 1.769  (4.63)
0.003* (1.63) -
0.816*  (19.23) 0.242*  (4.42)
0.031   (0.424) 0.017*  (0.57)
-0.002  (-0.69) -0.029   (-0.67)
0.059*  (2
FE
IV IV
SM
-1
SM
POOLED PANEL
Constant -5
TIME
lnEprice
DPUB
lnMS
lnFUEL .85) 0.071*  (3.05)
-0.002  (-0.12) 0.195*  (2.44)
0.006  (0.67) 0.050*   (1.76)
0.798 0.881
/ 2.27/-0.14 2.12/-0.07
0.78 2..83
2
lnSCALE
lnPRODS
R
DW AC
Hausman
 
 
*)  significant at 10% critical level or below 
     POOLEDIV: Instrumental variables (IV) estimation. Instruments: all exogenous  
     variables (TIME, DPUB, lnFUEL) and one year lagged values of lnFUEL and  
     endogenous variables (lnMSSM, lnSCALE, lnPRODS).  
    :  2-way fixed effect (2FE) panel data instrumental variable estimation (IV).    2FEIVPANEL
     Instruments: (DPUB, lnFUEL) and one year lagged values of lnFUEL and  
     endogenous variables (lnMSSM, lnSCALE, lnPRODS).  
     DW/AC:  Durbin-Watson test statistics and estimated residual 1st order autocorrelation  
     Hausman: Orthogonality test for valid instruments (H0: ) IVCorr(X ,ε)=0
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APPENDIX  Ic. IV (2SLS) estimation results for district heat energy total tariff in Finland  
                            (Apartment houses, ). Number of firms AlnEprice 76N = . Years 1997- 
                            2002,   (HCSE -corrected t-values in parenthesis).  .6T =
 
 
                               
2
10.179*  (-2.21) 2.140  (3.17)
0.005* (2.34) -
0.750*  (10.81) 0.175*  (3.32)
-0.085   (-1.07) 0.041  (1.19)
0.001  (0.11) -0.142   (-0.95)
0.049*  (2.01)
FE
IV IV
A
-1
A
POOLED PANEL
Constant -
TIME
lnEprice
DPUB
lnMS
lnFUEL 0.086*  (3.11)
0.014  (0.71) 0.229*  (2.55)
0.024*  (2.68) 0.058*   (1.77)
0.691 0.838
/ 2.17/-0.09 2.09/-0.06
2.76 3.70
2
lnSCALE
lnPRODS
R
DW AC
Hausman
 
 
 
*)  significant at 10% critical level or below 
 
     POOLEDIV: Instrumental variables (IV) estimation. Instruments: all exogenous  
     variables (TIME, DPUB, lnFUEL) and one year lagged values of lnFUEL and  
     endogenous variables (lnMSA, lnSCALE, lnPRODS).  
 
    :  2-way fixed effect (2FE) panel data instrumental variable estimation (IV).    2FEIVPANEL
     Instruments: (DPUB, lnFUEL) and one year lagged values of lnFUEL and  
     endogenous variables (lnMSA, lnSCALE,  nPRODS).  
 
     DW/AC:  Durbin-Watson test statistics and estimated residual 1st order autocorrelation  
 
     Hausman: Orthogonality test for valid instruments (H0: ) IVCorr(X ,ε)=0
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